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1 Introduction
In the developed countries whose economic conditions are not so different, each situation in
the welfare benefit program is different. In Japan and Germany, the level of welfare is high,
but the recipients ratio, which is the number of welfare recipients divided by total population,
is low. In contrast, the United Kingdom and the United States have lower levels of welfare but
higher the recipients ratio (Tachibanaki and Urakawa, 2006). This paper attempts to present
a theoretical model which can explain this phenomenon and to confirm this relationship in
panel data of 25 countries, from 2007 to 2012.
To analyze welfare programs, most public economics researchers exploit a labor supply
model that is based on the maximization problem of leisure and consumption goods. This
model can explain ‘welfare fraud’ but not ‘non-take-up of welfare’: welfare fraud means
households take-up even though they are non-eligible; non-take-up welfare signifies that needy
poor people do not take-up welfare even though they are approved to take-up. However,
‘non-take-up’ occurs in most developed countries (Currie, 2006; Immervoll, 2009; Plueger,
2009). Moreover, the result in comparative statics in the standard model cannot explain
this relationship between the level of welfare and the recipients ratio since the increase in
the level of welfare always increases the incentive of taking-up welfare. Thus, the standard
model cannot illustrate two phenomena: non-take-up and the counterintuitive relationship
between the welfare level and the recipients ratio in developed countries such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan.
That is to say; there exist some factors that are not considered in the standard model.
One of such factors is welfare stigma. Stigma is a sociological concept describing a negative
label applied to behavior by society or a social group (Goffman, 1963). In particular, stigma
is an important concept in social psychology (Major et al., 2018). The term welfare stigma
refers to the socio-psychological effects and psychological costs associated with taking-up
welfare (Besley and Coate, 1992). The mechanism of the occurrence of welfare stigma have
been argued mainly in sociological studies (Spicker, 1984). Welfare stigma is thought to arise
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from a negative social image of recipients based on the perception that recipients are inferior
to non-recipients. Consequently, recipients are treated as socially undesirable compared to
non-recipients, then reducing the utility of recipients. This study aims to explain abovemen-
tioned two phenomena by analyzing the interdependence between the welfare stigma level
and decision making of the workable and non-workable type individuals.
This study extends the model of Besley and Coate (1992) to explain the occurrence of
non-take-up of welfare benefits. Unlike Besley and Coate (1992), we endogenize decision-
making for needy poor people. The result in our comparative static analysis indicates that
an increase in the benefit level can decrease the ratio of welfare recipients to population. To
verify the result, this study conducts an empirical analysis using panel data. The results of
the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical analysis.
Our model considers two types of workable and non-workable. The workable type chooses
whether to work or take-up welfare, while the non-workable type chooses whether to take-up
or not. If individuals take-up welfare benefit, they suffer from disutility due to social stigma.
This stigma cost is endogenously determined, and the higher the conditional probability
that a recipient is a fraudulent recipient, the higher the stigma cost. Sensitivities to stigma
costs are distributed among workable and non-workable types, respectively. In the workable
type, less sensitive individuals take-up welfare and more sensitive individuals choose to work.
On the other hand, in the non-workable type, less sensitive individuals choose to take-up
welfare, while more sensitive individuals do not take-up it. In the equilibrium, the decision
of the workable type, the decision of the non-workable type and the level of stigma cost are
determined interdependently.
In our empirical analysis, we use panel data obtained by OECD.stat from 2007 to 2012
for 25 developed countries to examine the relationship between the level of social welfare
receipts and the recipients ratio as indicated by the model described above. Regression
analysis using five estimation methods that take into account unknown confounding factors
shows that the relationship between the level of social welfare receipts and the recipients ratio
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shows a statistically significant inverse U-shape. In addition, sensitivity analysis confirms the
robustness of this result. Thus, using these OECD panel data, we find that the results of the
empirical analysis are consistent with the model described earlier for the period 2007-2012
for these countries.
There are several studies on the welfare stigma conducting theoretical and/or empirical
analysis. Moffitt (1983) conducted one of the earlier studies to focus on welfare stigma in
economics by analyzing household decision-making regarding whether to take up welfare
benefits or supply labor by including the stigma as a kind of monetary cost. Moreover,
that paper empirically examined theoretical results using panel study of income dynamics
(PSID). Consequently, that author suggested that fixed stigma is statistically significant, but
that variable stigma with respect to benefit level is not. Besley and Coate (1992)’s pioneering
research analyzed situations wherein stigmas were endogenized. They presented two models
of social stigma: statistical discrimination and taxpayer resentment. Their results indicated
the occurrence of welfare fraud. As needy types usually chose to take-up welfare benefits, non-
take-up of welfare benefits did not manifest in their model. Blumkin et al. (2015) analyzed
welfare stigma as a policy tool, which was used to restrain welfare fraud. However, take-up
rate in the United Kingdom was approximately 80 % (Duclos, 1995), approximately 60—
67 % in the United States (Blank and Ruggles, 1996), approximately 37 % in Germany
(Riphahn, 2001) and 16.3—19.7 % in Japan (Tachibanaki and Urakawa, 2006). Thus, non-
take-up welfare did not manifest in their model1. One of the few exceptions is Itaya and
Kurita (2020). Itaya and Kurita (2020) analyzes both welfare fraud and non-take-up using
the replicator dynamics while this paper analyzes a static model.
The contribution of this study is the following; first, we construct a model in which
non-take-up and welfare fraud coexist in equilibrium, and show that a comparative statistic
analysis reveals the possibility that the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit level increases.
Second, in the empirical analysis using the macro panel data, we find that this association
1Hupkau and Maniquet (2018) analyzed the problem of non-take-up of welfare from the perspective of
identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Kranton, 2016)
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is observed and that the benefit level and the recipients ratio show an inverse U-shaped
relationship.
The structure of this paper is as follows; the next section presents the theoretical model
and comparative static analysis. The forth section conducts empirical analysis regarding the
relationship the between benefit level and the recipients ratio. The final section concludes
this paper.
2 Model
This study develops a model to analyze the interaction between welfare stigma, welfare fraud,
and non-take-up. There are two types in the model, the workable type and the non-workable
type. The workable type chooses to work or take-up welfare, and the non-workable type
chooses to take-up welfare or not. Each individual makes a decision corresponding to the level
of stigma cost by taking up welfare. This stigma cost is determined endogenously, and the
higher the conditional probability that the recipient is a fraudulent recipient, the higher the
stigma cost. The sensitivity to stigma costs is distributed in the workable and non-workable
types, respectively; in the workable type, those who are less sensitive take-up welfare and
those who are more sensitive choose to work. In the non-workable type, on the other hand,
those who are less sensitive choose to take-up welfare, while those who are more sensitive
choose not to take-up. In the equilibrium, the decision of the workable type, the decision of
the non-workable type and the level of stigma cost are determined interdependently.
In the comparative static analysis, we show the result the possibility that the recipients
ratio decreases as the benefit level increases. This result is testified by our empirical analysis
using panel data in the next section.
Let us see the basic setting of the model in the next subsection.
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2.1 The basic setting
There are two types in the economy, the needy type and the non-needy type. A ‘needy
type’ is an individual who cannot work and a ‘non-needy type’ is defined as an individual
who can work if he or she hopes so. We assume that a proportion of needy types in the
total population is γ ∈ (0, 1). In the economy, needy types are eligible for welfare benefits,
and non-needy types are not. That is, it is called ‘non-take-up welfare’ that the needy type
does not take-up welfare benefit and ‘welfare fraud’ that the non-needy type take-up welfare
benefit. To make the notation clear, we denote the needy type as ‘type 1’ and the non-needy
as ‘type 2’. Type 1 individuals have two choices; take-up welfare or not. The utility setting
is,


u (b, z1)− φ1s (p, q, z1) if taking up welfare,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where s is an index of stigma cost, which is explained later, p is a proportion of recipients
to sub-population in type 1, q is a proportion of recipients to sub-population in type 2 and
φ is the sensitivity to stigma. u(·, ·) denotes a material utility, zi is type i’s capability of
consumption, i = 1, 2. b is a level of welfare benefit. We assume the following properties,
∀zi, i = 1, 2, an income I = w, b. For simplicity, we assume the price of consumption good is
1.
∂u(I,zi)
∂I
> 0,
∂u(I,zi)
∂zi
> 0,
∂u(I,zi)
∂I∂zi
≥ 0.
(2)
The third property means that capability and consumption are complementary.
Type 2 individuals have two choices to either accept welfare benefits or work. Type 2’s
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utility setting is as follows:


u (b, z2)− φ2s (p, q, z2) if taking up welfare,
u (w, z2)− θ if working.
(3)
Here θ is disutility of labor, and w is work income. φi is uniformly distributed from 0 to φ
among type i’s sub-population, φi and φj are i.i.d, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. We assume z2 > z1,
that is to say, type 2’s capability is higher than that of type 1 individuals who cannot work
because of time constraints, physical disabilities or mental illness. These constraints can
affect consumption. For example, it makes sense that a single-parent household with limited
free time will not enjoy consumption from income I less than a parent’s household.
2.2 The critical level of sensitivity to stigma
To understand a household’s decision-making, we consider the critical sensitivity of stigma
cost, φi, as follows:
u (b, z1)− φˆ1s (p, q, z1) = 0, (4)
u (b, z2)− φˆ2s (p, q; z2) = u (w, z2)− θ. (5)
A type 1 household, where φ1 is less than or equal to φˆ1 prefers to take-up welfare. Then,
all households in which φ1 ∈
[
0, φˆ1
]
choose to take-up welfare and all households in which
φ1 ∈
(
φˆ1, φ
]
do not. Similarly, type 2 households in which φ2 is less than or equal to φˆ2
prefer to take-up welfare. All households in which φ2 ∈
[
0, φˆ2
]
choose to take-up welfare On
the other hand, all households in which φ1 ∈
(
φˆ1, φ
]
choose to work.
The proportion of recipients in type 1, p, is as follows:
p = min
{
φˆ1
φ
, 1
}
= min
{
u (b, z1)
φs (p, q, z1)
, 1
}
. (6)
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While the proportion of recipients in type 2, q, is as follows:
q = min
{
φˆ2
φ
, 1
}
= min
{
u (b, z2)− u (w, z2) + θ
φs (p, q, z2)
, 1
}
. (7)
In the next subsection, we consider the formulation of the stigma cost and the equilibrium
in the model.
2.3 Formulation of the stigma cost function
In this subsection, we formulate the stigma cost function. The stigma cost is endogenously
determined, and the higher the conditional probability that a recipient is a non-needy type,
i.e., fraudulent recipient, the higher the stigma cost. The probability that a recipient are
non-needy is given by the following:
Pr(i = 2|Take-up welfare) =
(1− γ)q
γp+ (1− γ)q
:= Π. (8)
We assume that stigma cost is an increasing function with Π as follows:
s = s (Π(p, q), zi) ,
∂s (Π(p, q), zi)
∂Π
> 0, for i = 1, 2.
(9)
This formulation is inspired by the statistical stigma in Besley and Coate (1992) and
Blumkin et al. (2015). Setting a stigma means as follows. People in society despise ‘welfare
fraud’ (the taking-up welfare by non-needy type (type 2)). However, without distinguish-
ing between type 1 and 2, it is difficult to know whether welfare fraud is actually being
committed. This stems from the idea that, in the world, it is not reprehensible for a truly
needy individual to take-up welfare, but a negative image is formed of an individual who is
non-needy individual taking-up welfare, which causes stigma.
Stigma cost is a function of capability. While Besley and Coate (1992) assumed that
stigma cost was the same for all recipients, we differentiate stigma cost by the capabilities of
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type 1 and 2. Even though, we do not assume the sign of ∂s (Π, zi) /∂zi. We denote pi as the
ratio p/q, then,
Π =
1
γp/(1− γ)q + 1
=
1
γ/(1− γ)pi + 1
. (10)
We can rewrite equation (9) as follows:
s = s (Π(p, q), zi) = s (Π(p/q, 1), zi) := s (pi, zi) . (11)
Clearly, we obtain the following:
∂s (Π, zi)
∂Π
∂Π
∂pi
< 0. (12)
An equilibrium point corresponds to a solution in the following simultaneous equation:


p =
uˆ (b, z1)
φs (pi, z1)
,
q =
uˆ (b, z2)
φs (pi, z2)
,
pi =
p
q
.
(13)
Substituting the first and the second row equations into the right hand side of the third
row equation of equation (13), it indicates
pi =
p(pi)
q(pi)
=
uˆ (b, z1)
uˆ (b, z2)
s (pi, z2)
s (pi, z1)
:= M(pi).
(14)
Here,
uˆ (b, z1) ≡ u (b, z1) ,
uˆ (b, z2) ≡ u (b, z2)− u (w, z2) + θ,
(15)
uˆ(b, zi) is the incremental material utility when taking-up welfare. M(pi) is a mapping
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from pi to itself. By differentiation, we obtain the following:
dM(pi)
dpi
=
uˆ (b, z1)
uˆ (b, z2)
[
∂s (pi, z2) /∂pi
s (pi, z1)
−
s (pi, z2)
s (pi, z1)
2
∂s (pi, z1)
∂pi
]
=
uˆ (b, z1)
uˆ (b, z2)
s (pi, z2)
s (pi, z1)
[
∂s (pi, z2) /∂pi
s (pi, z2)
−
∂s (pi, z1) /∂pi
s (pi, z1)
]
=
∂s (pi, z2)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z2)
−
∂s (pi, z1)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z1)
.
(16)
Here, we define the elasticity of stigma cost to pi:
εpi (zi) ≡ −
∂s (pi, zi)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, zi)
. (17)
Using this elasticity, we rewrite this as given:
dM(pi)
dpi
= εpi (z1)− εpi (z2) . (18)
Equation (18) corresponds to a slope of M(pi), which is a change of ratio to itself. Then, if
εpi (z1) − εpi (z2) in some domain, the possibility of multiple equilibria exists. The stability
condition is
εpi (z1)− εpi (z2) < 1. (19)
We henceforth focus on the equilibrium where the stability condition is kept. The next
subsection presents the comparative static analysis focusing on an effect of changes in the
benefit level on the recipients ratio in each type and the economy.
2.4 Comparative statics
In this subsection, we conduct comparative statics. We are particularly interested in how a
change in benefit level to equilibrium and we compare our empirical evidence and theoretical
results.
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We define the elasticity as follows:
ηb (zi) ≡
∂uˆ (b, zi)
∂b
b
uˆ (b, zi)
. (20)
This is an elasticity of material utility to benefit level. The result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1
sgn
[
dp∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
εpi∗ (z1)
1 + εpi∗ (z2)
]
, (21)
sgn
[
dq∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1 + εpi∗ (z1)
εpi∗ (z2)
]
, (22)
sgn
[
dpi∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
− 1
]
. (23)
Proof. See appendix.
When the ratio, ηb(z1)/ηb(z2), is sufficiently low, the equilibrium proportion of recipient
in the needy type, p∗, the equilibrium proportion of recipient in the non-needy type, q∗, and
the ratio of them, pi∗ = p∗/q∗, decrease in the level of welfare benefit.
The implication of the Proposition 2.4 is the following. If the non-needy type’s elasticity
of material utility to benefit level is sufficiently relatively higher than the needy type’s, the
impact of increasing in recipients of the non-needy type to stigma, it is the direct effect of
an increase in benefit level, is stronger than that of the needy type, then the level of stigma
cost raises. If this increase of the stigma cost level is sufficiently large, the indirect effect,
disincentive effect to take-up welfare from an increase in stigma, outweighs the direct effect,
the incentive effect to take-up welfare from an increase in the benefit level, resulting in fewer
beneficiaries.
Let denote R as a proportion of recipients to total population. Since the size of population
is normalized to 1, R is given as follows:
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R = γp+ (1− γ)q. (24)
An effect of a change in benefit level on R is:
dR∗
db
= γ
dp∗
db
+ (1− γ)
dq∗
db
. (25)
The sign of an effect of a change in benefit level on the recipients ratio is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 The sign of dR
∗
db
is:
sgn
dR∗
db
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1− γ + εpi∗ (z1)
γ + εpi∗ (z2)
]
. (26)
The Proposition 2.4 reveals the possibility that the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit
level increases.
The recipients ratio increases in the benefit level when the ratio of elasticity, ηb(z1)/ηb(z2),
is sufficiently low, vice versa. The mechanism of the Proposition is similar to the Proposition
since the effect of a change in benefit level on the recipients ratio is the total effect of adding
the effect on the needy type and the effect on the non-needy type.
In this section, we construct a theoretical model that can account for welfare-fraud and
non-take-up simultaneously; the welfare stigma cost varies with the quality of the recipient,
and the decision-making of potential recipients depends on the expectation for the level of
stigma cost; the stigma cost is assumed to rise with respect to the conditional probability
that the recipient is a fraudulent recipient. This stems from the idea that, in this world,
it is not condemnable for a true needy person to take-up welfare, but a negative image is
formed about a non-needy person take-up welfare, which becomes a source of stigma. In the
equilibrium, welfare-fraud and non-take-up occur simultaneously. In the comparative static
analysis, we show that an increase in the level of benefits can result in a decrease in the
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recipients ratio for the workable type and the recipients ratio for the unworkable type. Thus,
the recipients ratio of the economy as a whole could also be lower with respect to the level of
benefits. In the next section, we empirically test the results of this theoretical analysis using
OECD panel data.
3 Empirical analysis
This section presents empirical evidence to verify the analysis in Section 2 by exploring the
relationship between the recipients ratio and the minimum income benefit level using the
OECD panel data.
3.1 Econometric model
The panel data were analyzed to investigate the correlation between the minimum guaran-
teed income level and social benefit recipients. The decision to employ the panel data to
investigate the relationship reflects three motivations. First, a panel data model can have
better prediction accuracy than the cross-sectional model and time-series model because it
has more observations than cross-section data and time-series data. Second, it enables re-
searchers to address the issue of endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias. Third, it allows
us to include changes in society in the empirical analysis (Greene, 2012). This paper analyzes
the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and social benefit recipients ratio
based on the baseline model:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit, (27)
where yit is the dependent variable, x
′
it is the K-dimensional vector of predictors consisting of
the target explanatory variable and the covariates, β is the K-dimensional vector of unknown
parameters, and eit is the disturbance term, which is distributed as eit ∼ N (0, σ
2
e). Further-
more, in equation (27), i = 1, . . . n indicates the index for a country, whereas t = 1, . . . , T
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represents the index for time. The OLS estimation of equation (27) after pooling the available
data is called the pooling estimation.
When we consider the country-specific heterogeneity in the disturbance term of equation
(27), eit can be decomposed as follows:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit
eit = αi + νit, (28)
where αi is the error depending on the country i and νit ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ
2
ν) is the stochastic dis-
turbance term. Equation (28) can be considered a one-way error component model (Baltagi,
1984) because it decomposes the disturbance term eit into the error based on the individual
heterogeneity and the stochastic error. The model in equation (28) can be estimated using
a one-way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter, one-way FE) and the one-way random-effect
estimator (hereinafter, one-way RE). The one-way FE presumes the binary dummy variable
for αi whereas the one-way RE assumes that the individual effect is randomly determined.
Considering the heterogeneity caused by the individual effect as in equation (27), the
disturbance term can be further decomposed to incorporate heterogeneity in time:
yit = x
′
itβ + eit
eit = αi + λt + νit, (29)
where λt is the error depending on the time t. Equation (29), a two-way error component
model (Baltagi, 1984), decomposes the disturbance term into the error based on the hetero-
geneity of country i, the error caused by the time such as economic shocks, and the stochastic
disturbance. As with equation (28),the model of equation (29) can be estimated by a two-
way fixed-effect estimator (hereinafter, two-way FE) and a two-way random-effect estimator
(hereinafter, two-way RE).
This paper estimates the relationship between the minimum income benefit level and
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social benefit recipients using five estimation methods: pooling, one-way FE, one-way RE,
two-way FE, and two-way RE. These estimation methods are assessed via hypothesis testing.
We first implement the F -test for pooling versus one-way FE or two-way FE. Second, we
perform the Lagrange multiplier test (hereinafter, LM -test) (Honda, 1985) for pooling versus
one-way RE or two-way RE. Finally, we conduct a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) for one-
way RE versus one-way FE, two-way RE, and two-way FE. Further information on hypothesis
testing in the panel data analysis has been given by Baltagi (2008).
3.2 Data
This section proposes the detail of our dataset used for estimation of the panel data models
introduced in Section 3.1. All of the data described below were obtained from OECD.Stat
(OECD, 2019).
For the dependent variable, we use the logit-transformed version (logit recipients ratio)
of the recipients ratio (recipients ratio), which is the ratio of social benefit recipients to
the total population. Data on the number of social benefit recipients were retrieved from the
Social Benefit Recipients Database, and total population data were obtained from Population
Statistics.
For the target explanatory variable, we include the minimum guaranteed income mgincome,
which represents the degree of social benefits in terms of the ratio of the per capita social
benefits to the median per capita income. These data can be retrieved from the Adequacy
of Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefits. Furthermore, we incorporate the quadratic term
mgincome (mgincome 2) to consider the nonlinear effect of the target explanatory variable.
In order to account for any estimation biases caused by unobserved confounders, we
additionally incorporate the following covariates into the vector of predictors:
• log gdp capita: the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (gdp capita), retrieved from
Annual National Accounts. GDP per capita, which reflects the economic situation in
each country, are likely to have an immediate impact on the recipients ratio, but
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there is relatively delayed impact on mgincome.
• youth dependency: ratio of young population (0 to 14 years old) to productive pop-
ulation (15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics. It reflects the demographic
burden of each country (the ratio of the unproductive population to the productive
population). The proportion of younger unproductive population is expected to affect
the recipients ratio; it is unlikely to have effect on mgincome.
• old dependency: ratio of old population (over 65 years old) to productive population
(15 to 64), retrieved from Population Statistics. The proportion of older unproductive
population is expected to affect the recipients ratio; it is unlikely to have effect on
mgincome.
• divorce rate: the marriage divorce rate, retrieved from Family Database. It is a proxy
of the household structure, which has impact on the recipients ratio throughout
time. The tighter the time constraints, the lower the income.
• unemployment: the national unemployment rate for working-age population, retrieved
from Labor Force Statistics. It is similar to log gdp capita, which reflects the eco-
nomic situation in each country.
• population growth: the population growth, retrieved from Population Statistics and
calculated by the authors. It could be a confounding factor that positively affects both
recipients ratio and mgincome. This is because recipients ratio is calculated as
the ratio of recipients to the population, while mgincome is likely to be affected by
population growth through economic growth (Brueckner and Schwandt, 2015).
The panel dataset using a date on the aforementioned variables. After reducing some
missing series in the sample that was not randomly missing, we obtain panel data on n = 25
countries covering the time frame 2007 to 2012. This paper conducts the empirical analysis
using the panel data with the number of observation nT = N = 150.
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3.3 Result
This section presents the result of the empirical analysis investigating the relationship be-
tween the minimum guaranteed income level on the ratio of the number of recipients.
To begin with, let us simply look at the differences in mgincome by country and year.
mgincome, one of the levels of social welfare, represents the share of social welfare benefits in
median disposable income. In order to look at each of those factors that determine mgincome,
the relationship between the median disposable income and the amount of benefits is shown
as Figure 1. The median income for each year in each country was obtained from the Income
Distribution Database of OECD.stat, and the social welfare benefits were calculated using the
median disposable income as described above. For median social welfare benefits and income,
both units are converted to US dollars in each year. This scatterplot simply shows a positive
linear relationship between welfare benefits and the median income, and the difference in
social welfare systems does not appear to be very large. However, this is a simple correlation
and not a partial correlation considering unknown confounding factors, which may be a
spurious correlation. This motivates us to carry out more complex analyses.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of pooled panel data. This table demonstrates
the large inequality between the minimum and maximum recipients ratio (minimum: 0.001,
maximum: 0.037). Furthermore, the maximum of mgincome in Table 1 indicates that coun-
tries tend to guarantee almost 60% of the median per capita income through its social benefit
programme, although the median and mean of the guaranteed minimum income is about 40%.
Examining the descriptive statistics by country, Tables 2 and 3 indicate the necessity of
adjustment by covariates or dealing with country-based heterogeneity when we assume that
the minimum income benefit level is the determinant factor influencing benefit recipients/
total population ratio. For example, Canada and the Slovak Republic have the same max-
imum mean of recipients ratio (0.034); however, their mean minimum guaranteed income
level differs (Canada: 0.368, Slovak Republic: 0.238).
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics by year. Although no large difference in means
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and medians can be found in this table, the standard deviation of the minimum guaranteed
income level has a relatively large outlier in 2012 (0.89). This motivates us to include time-
specific heterogeneity into our model by estimating the two-way error component model.
Before proceeding to regression analysis, let us discuss the simple correlation between
benefit level and recipients ratio. Figure 2 presents the scatter plot of the observed cou-
ples (mgincome, recipients ratio). Even though the figure depicts the roughly convex
relationship of two variables in interest, possible confounders might lead to a spurious corre-
lation among them. We thus discuss a regression analysis taking into account other factors,
which may affect both of these target variables, and unobserved heterogeneity pertaining to
country-specific factors and time-specific factors.
As the main findings in this empirical evidence, Table 5 shows the estimation results of
panel data regression models based on the data introduced in Section 3.2. Each row corre-
sponds to an explanatory variable, and each column corresponds to an estimation method.
The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are estimated using the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent estimator (hereinafter HAC estimator) of Arellano (1987).
The bottom part of this table gives the results of the hypothesis testing carried out for model
evaluation.
Regarding the hypothesis testing concerning the pooling estimation, both one-way FE and
two-way FE are accepted at 1% statistical significance according to the F -test results. LM -
tests for the random-effect estimators reject the pooling estimation at 1% significance but
accept the one-way RE and two-way RE at the same level of significance. In the comparison
of fixed-effect estimators and random-effect estimators, Hausman tests do not reject either
one-way RE or two-way RE. Furthermore, neither of the fixed-effect estimators are accepted.
Looking at the estimated coefficients by pooling estimation, mgincome has a significantly
positive effect on the recipients ratio, and its quadratic term has a significantly negative
effect on the recipients ratio. This suggests that the minimum guaranteed income level has
an upper convex effect on recipients/population ratio. However, the results of F -test, which
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compares the pooling estimation with the fixed-effect estimators, and of the LM -test, which
compares the pooling estimation with the random-effect estimators, highlight the necessity
to take heterogeneity in a country or in both a country and time into account.
The Hausman test results in Table 5 suggest that the correlation between the explanatory
variables and country effect or between the explanatory variables and both country effect and
time effect is not statistically significant, i.e., the correlation between xit and αi or xit and
both αi and λt is not statistically significant. Therefore, the random-effect estimator, which
assumes no correlation between the explanatory variables and decomposed effects such as
αi and λt, is the most preferable method according to the hypothesis test results. In the
estimation result of one-way RE considering country-specific heterogeneity, the minimum
guaranteed income level has an upper convex effect on recipients/population ratio as well as
the pooling estimation. This relationship is similar to the one found in the estimation of the
two-way error component models.
Figure 3 presents the fitted curve of one-way RE with the scatter plot of the couples of
observations (mgincome, logit recipients ratio). As we discussed, the one-way RE curve
indeed visually indicates the upper convex relationship between the benefit level and the
recipients ratio.
The relationship between the level of social welfare and the recipients ratio shown by
this empirical analysis, given the background of the theoretical analysis, is that according to
Proposition 2.4, an increase in the level of benefits has a direct effect in both needy and non-
needy types. The direct effect is that an increase in the level of benefits raises the material
utility of taking-up welfare and increases the incentive of taking-up it. On the other hand,
indirect effects also occur; this indirect effect shows a negative sign when the rate of increase
in non-needy type recipients is greater than the rate of increase in needy type recipients when
the benefit level increases, which gives a disincentive effect of taking-up welfare. When the
indirect effect is negative and its magnitude is large, the effect dominates the direct effect
and the total effect is thus negative. Combining the inverse U-shaped relationship and the
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theoretical mechanism of the empirical analysis of mgincome and logit recipients ratio,
it can be said that when the benefit level is low, the direct effect dominates the indirect
effect, or the indirect effect is also positive. On the other hand, when the benefit level is
somewhat higher, the indirect effect is negative, which further dominates the direct effect
and the recipients ratio thus decreases.
Figure 4 gives two categories and members defined by an estimated maximum value of
recipients ratio. Each member is shown in Tables 6 and 7. ‘group 1’, whose members have less
mgincome than the threshold, the benefit level corresponding to an estimated maximum of
logit recipients ratio by one-way RE, includes Austria, Canada and Spain. On the other
hand, ‘group 2’, whose members have more mgincome than the benefit level corresponding
to an estimated maximum of logit recipients ratio, includes Netherlands, Denmark and
Germany.
For example, Figure 4 shows that Spain, a ‘group 1’ country, has a low level of social
welfare benefits and a low recipients ratio for the period 2007–2012. Moreover, the recipients
ratio is the highest for countries with high benefit levels, such as France for the period 2007–
2012. Therefore, it can be seen that there is a positive relationship between the benefit level
and the recipients ratio in ‘group 1’. On the other hand, the recipients ratio has started to
decrease in the situation where the benefit level increased from 2007 to 2012 in Switzerland
and Australia, which are ‘group 2’ countries that are above the threshold of mgincome defined
in our estimated maximum recipients ratio by one-way RE. In addition, if we consider the
countries with higher benefit levels than those in Switzerland and Australia, we can see that
Germany has a higher benefit level and a much lower recipients ratio from 2007 to 2012.
Therefore, it can be seen that the benefit level and recipients ratio are negatively related in
‘group 2’.
To confirm the robustness of the estimated results obtained so far, we perform a sensitivity
analysis by excluding covariates. Table 8 shows the results of the one-way RE estimation by
adding the covariates one by one. The reason for choosing one-way RE as the estimator here
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is that it is the most statistically significant as a result of the hypothesis testing for each
estimator using the full model described above. As this Table shows, coefficient of mgincome
is positive in all cases where covariates are lacking, and the squared term of mgincome shows
a significant negative coefficient. All of the estimation results in Table 8 show a relationship
that is consistent with the results that have been estimated by the full model. The sensitivity
analysis therefore strengthens the robust inverse U-shaped relationship between the level of
social welfare benefits and the recipients ratio, which has been estimated so far.
In this section, an empirical analysis is conducted to verify the results of the theoretical
analysis up to the previous section using OECD panel data for the period 2007–2012. The
results of this empirical analysis show that the relationship between the benefit level and the
recipients ratio in a given country is shown by an inverse U-shape, and the robustness of this
result is further confirmed by a sensitivity analysis. The results of these empirical analyses
reinforce the counterintuitive theoretical consequence that, under ceteris-paribus, an increase
in benefit levels leads to a decrease in the recipients ratio.
4 Conclusion
This study contributed in the following points; first, we constructed the model in which non-
take-up and welfare fraud coexist in equilibrium, and showed that a comparative statistic
analysis reveals the possibility that the recipients ratio decreases as the benefit level increases.
Second, in the empirical analysis using the macro panel data, we find that this association
is observed and that the benefit level and the recipients ratio show an inverse U-shaped
relationship. The results of this empirical analysis supported the counterintuitive theoretical
result that a rise in the benefit level leads to a lower the recipients ratio, when other conditions
are held constant.
In this paper, we consider only the discrete decision to participate or not to participate
in the labor market. Labor supply decisions after labor market participation are continu-
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ous, and both intensive and extensive margin are important in considering welfare benefit
programs. Saez (2002) analyzes optimal income transfers in light of both of these. Future
work introduces an endogenous stigma into the framework of Saez (2002) to analyze a more
realistic model and present practical policy implications.
Although this paper and Besley and Coate (1992) analyze static model of welfare stigma,
we have the following questions. How welfare stigma and behavior of potential recipients
change in long-term? How is the dynamics of welfare stigma and potential recipients’ be-
havior in the process of adjustment to an equilibrium? Itaya and Kurita (2020) attempts to
investigate such questions using the replicator dynamics.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Equilibrium equations are as follows:

p =
uˆ (b, z1)
φs (pi, z1)
,
q =
uˆ (b, z2)
φs (pi, z2)
,
pi =
p
q
.
By logarithmic transformation, we obtain the following:

ln p = ln uˆ (b, z1)− ln s (pi, z1)− lnφ,
ln q = ln uˆ (b, z2)− ln s (pi, z2)− lnφ,
ln pi = ln p− ln q.
By totally differentiating and setting dθ = dw = dφ = dz1 = dz2 = dγ = 0,

dp
p
=
∂uˆ (b, z1) /∂b
uˆ (b, z1)
db−
∂s (pi, z1) /∂pi
s (pi, z1)
dpi,
dq
q
=
∂uˆ (b, z2) /∂b
uˆ (b, z2)
db−
∂s (pi, z2) /∂pi
s (pi, z2)
dpi,
dpi
pi
=
dp
p
−
dq
q
.
⇐⇒

dp
p
=
∂aˆ (b, z1)
∂b
b
uˆ (b, z1)
db
b
−
∂s (pi, z1)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z1)
dpi
pi
,
dq
q
=
∂aˆ (b, z2)
∂b
b
uˆ (b, z2)
db
b
−
∂s (pi, z2)
∂pi
pi
s (pi, z2)
dpi
pi
,
dpi
pi
=
dp
p
−
dq
q
.
⇐⇒

dp
p
= ηb (z1)
db
b
+ εpi (z1)
dpi
pi
,
dq
q
= ηb (z2)
db
b
+ εpi (z2)
dpi
pi
,
dpi
pi
=
dp
p
−
dq
q
.
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A matrix representation is given below:

 1 0 −εpi (z1)0 1 −εpi (z2)
1 −1 −1




dp/p
db/b
dq/q
db/b
dpi/pi
db/b

 =

 ηb (z1)ηb (z2)
0

 .
By Cramer’s rule, solutions are given as follows:
dp/p
db/b
=
−ηb (z1) [1 + εpi (z2)] + ηb (z2) εpi (z1)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
,
dq/q
db/b
=
ηb (z2) [1 + εpi (z1)]− ηb (z1) εpi (z2)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
,
dpi/pi
db/b
=
−ηb(z1) + ηb(z2)
εpi (z1)− [1 + εpi (z2)]
.
Since the stability condition is εpi∗ (z1)−εpi∗ (z2) < 1, the denominator, εpi(z1)−[1+εpi(z2)],
is negative.
Therefore, the result of comparative statics regarding a change in benefit level is given as
follows:
sgn
[
dp∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
εpi∗ (z1)
1 + εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dq∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
−
1 + εpi∗ (z1)
εpi∗ (z2)
]
,
sgn
[
dpi∗
db
]
= sgn
[
ηb (z1)
ηb (z2)
− 1
]
.
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Figure 1: Relationship between the median income and benefit level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries. All
numerical units are converted to US dollars for the corresponding year.
26
AU07
AU08
AU09
AU10
AU11
AU12
AT07
AT08
AT09
AT10
AT11
AT12
BE07
BE08BE09BE10BE11BE12
CA07CA08
CA09
CA10CA11CA12
CZ07
CZ08CZ09
CZ10
CZ11
CZ12
DK07
DK08
DK09
DK10
DK11
DK12
EE07
EE08
EE09
EE10EE11
EE12
FI078
FI09
FI10FI11 FI12
FR07
FR08
FR09
10
FR11
FR12
DE07DE08 DE0910DE11
DE12
HU07
HU08
HU09
HU10
HU11
HU12
IS07
IS08
IS09 IS10
IS11IS12
IL07
IL08IL09
IL10
IL11 IL12
KR07
KR08
KR09
10
KR11
KR12
LU07 LU08
LU09
LU10
LU11
LU12
NL07
NL08NL09
NL10
NL11NL12
NZ07NZ08NZ09Z10N 12
NO07NO08
NO09
10
NO11NO12
PL07
PL08
PL09PL10PL11
PL12
PT07
PT08
PT09
PT10
PT11PT12
SK07
SK08SK09
SK10
SK11
SK12
SI07
SI08
SI09
SI10
SI11
SI12
ES07ES08
ES09
ES10
ES11ES12
SE07SE08
SE09
SE10
SE11
SE12
CH07
CH08
CH0910
CH11
CH12
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
mgincome
re
ci
pi
en
ts
_r
a
tio
Figure 2: Simple relationship between the recipients ratio and benefit level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with
the last two digits of the year.
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Figure 3: Fitted curve of one-way RE and scatter plot between the recipients ratio and
benefit level
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with
the last two digits of the year. The dashed blue line indicates a location of mgincome which
corresponds to an estimated maximum of recipients ratio logit obtained by the fitted
curve of one-way RE. ‘group 1’ and ‘group 2’ are defined by the location based on the
dashed blue line. If an observed value of mgincome is less than the dashed blue line, it is
categorized as ‘group 1’ otherwise it is categorized as ‘group 2’.
28
AU07
AU08
A 09
AU10
AU11
AU12
AT07
AT08
AT09
10
AT11
AT12
BE07
BE08BE09BE10BE11BE12
CA07CA08
CA09
CA10CA11CA12
CZ07
CZ08CZ09
CZ10
CZ11
CZ12
DK07
DK08
DK09
DK10
DK11
DK12
EE07
EE08
EE09
EE10EE11
EE12
FI078
FI09FI10FI11 FI12
FR07
FR08
FR09
10
FR11
FR12
DE07
DE08 DE09DE10
DE11
DE12
HU07
HU08
HU09
HU10
HU11
HU12
IS07
IS08
IS09
IS10
IS11IS12
IL07
IL08IL09
IL10
IL11 IL12
KR07KR08KR0910
KR11
KR12
LU07 LU08
LU09
LU10
LU11LU12
NL07
NL08NL09
NL10
NL11NL12
NZ07
NZ08
NZ09
NZ10
NZ11
Z12
NO07NO08
NO09
10
NO11NO12
PL07
PL08PL09PL10PL11
PL12
PT07
PT08
PT09
PT10
PT11PT12
SK07
SK08SK09
SK10SK11SK12
SI07
SI08
SI09
SI10
SI11
SI12
ES07
ES08
ES09
ES10
ES11ES12
SE0708
SE09SE10SE11
SE12
CH07
CH08
CH0910
CH11
CH12
−6
−5
−4
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
mgincome
re
ci
pi
en
ts
_r
a
tio
_l
og
it
group
group_1
group_2
Figure 4: Scatter plot between the recipients ratio and benefit level, grouped
Notes: Strings accompanied by points indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with
the last two digits of the year. The dashed blue line indicates a location of mgincome which
corresponds to an estimated maximum of recipients ratio logit obtained by the fitted
curve of one-way RE. ‘group 1’ and ‘group 2’ are defined by the location based on the
dashed blue line. If an observed value of mgincome is less than the dashed blue line, it is
categorized as ‘group 1’ otherwise it is categorized as ‘group 2’.
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Table 1: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: whole data
Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max
recipients ratio 0.016 0.015 0.009 0.001 0.037
logit recipients ratio -4.327 -4.175 0.753 -6.591 -3.268
mgincome 0.397 0.400 0.082 0.230 0.590
mgincome 2 0.164 0.160 0.065 0.053 0.348
gdp capita 37704.939 37699.559 14081.170 16788.433 91814.013
log gdp capita 10.479 10.537 0.335 9.728 11.428
youth dependency 0.254 0.241 0.053 0.199 0.459
old dependency 0.229 0.238 0.040 0.138 0.314
divorce rate 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003
unemployment 0.074 0.072 0.037 0.023 0.249
population growth 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.025
Notes : T = 6, n = 25, N = 150.
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Table 2: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: by country (1)
country recipients ratio logit recipients ratio mgincome mgincome 2 gdp capita log gdp capita
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Australia 0.013 (0.001) -4.315 (0.074) 0.447 (0.010) 0.200 (0.009) 40852.112 (2156.481) 10.617 (0.053)
Austria 0.018 (0.002) -4.029 (0.138) 0.430 (0.039) 0.186 (0.035) 42435.028 (2584.710) 10.654 (0.060)
Belgium 0.009 (0.000) -4.744 (0.035) 0.437 (0.012) 0.191 (0.011) 39517.464 (2220.265) 10.583 (0.056)
Canada 0.034 (0.002) -3.335 (0.049) 0.368 (0.017) 0.136 (0.013) 40428.026 (1271.527) 10.607 (0.031)
Czech Republic 0.013 (0.006) -4.592 (0.996) 0.315 (0.032) 0.100 (0.022) 27776.316 (1070.706) 10.231 (0.039)
Denmark 0.015 (0.002) -4.161 (0.140) 0.575 (0.010) 0.331 (0.012) 42137.252 (2322.734) 10.647 (0.055)
Estonia 0.007 (0.003) -4.984 (0.433) 0.273 (0.033) 0.076 (0.018) 22846.807 (2032.578) 10.033 (0.088)
Finland 0.021 (0.001) -3.837 (0.056) 0.462 (0.010) 0.213 (0.009) 39257.144 (1350.605) 10.577 (0.034)
France 0.019 (0.002) -3.929 (0.094) 0.382 (0.004) 0.146 (0.003) 35822.205 (1475.914) 10.486 (0.041)
Germany 0.004 (0.000) -5.525 (0.044) 0.515 (0.008) 0.265 (0.009) 39925.940 (2678.832) 10.593 (0.066)
Hungary 0.023 (0.003) -3.747 (0.142) 0.365 (0.059) 0.136 (0.044) 21298.496 (1512.043) 9.964 (0.072)
Iceland 0.009 (0.001) -4.710 (0.076) 0.405 (0.038) 0.165 (0.031) 41380.192 (1215.725) 10.630 (0.029)
Israel 0.011 (0.001) -4.547 (0.090) 0.457 (0.008) 0.209 (0.007) 28872.669 (1899.220) 10.269 (0.065)
Korea 0.031 (0.002) -3.456 (0.055) 0.353 (0.014) 0.125 (0.010) 29748.950 (1733.041) 10.299 (0.058)
Luxembourg 0.017 (0.001) -4.050 (0.077) 0.428 (0.020) 0.184 (0.017) 86918.694 (3971.080) 11.372 (0.045)
Netherlands 0.020 (0.001) -3.902 (0.076) 0.510 (0.015) 0.260 (0.015) 45641.618 (1321.341) 10.728 (0.029)
New Zealand 0.002 (0.000) -6.368 (0.100) 0.418 (0.004) 0.175 (0.003) 30845.995 (1511.117) 10.336 (0.049)
Norway 0.010 (0.001) -4.610 (0.054) 0.400 (0.006) 0.160 (0.005) 59776.358 (3956.631) 10.997 (0.066)
Poland 0.012 (0.001) -4.378 (0.081) 0.325 (0.036) 0.107 (0.025) 20207.247 (2579.601) 9.907 (0.129)
Portugal 0.012 (0.002) -4.419 (0.128) 0.332 (0.026) 0.111 (0.017) 26558.193 (521.970 ) 10.187 (0.020)
Slovak Republic 0.034 (0.002) -3.360 (0.076) 0.238 (0.008) 0.057 (0.004) 24142.536 (2038.476) 10.089 (0.086)
Slovenia 0.022 (0.002) -3.818 (0.092) 0.418 (0.008) 0.175 (0.006) 28351.080 (880.111 ) 10.252 (0.031)
Spain 0.004 (0.001) -5.658 (0.320) 0.248 (0.013) 0.062 (0.007) 32403.199 (568.189 ) 10.386 (0.017)
Sweden 0.024 (0.001) -3.686 (0.055) 0.387 (0.010) 0.150 (0.008) 42080.770 (1911.048) 10.646 (0.045)
Switzerland 0.018 (0.001) -4.013 (0.055) 0.433 (0.015) 0.188 (0.013) 53399.177 (3100.762) 10.884 (0.058)
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150Numbers in parentheses stand for the standard deviation.
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Table 3: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: by country (2)
country youth dependency old dependency divorce rate unemployment population growth
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Australia 0.284 (0.002) 0.201 (0.007) 0.002 (0.000) 0.050 (0.005) 0.017 (0.003)
Austria 0.222 (0.006) 0.259 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.048 (0.004) 0.003 (0.001)
Belgium 0.257 (0.001) 0.261 (0.003) 0.003 (0.000) 0.076 (0.005) 0.009 (0.002)
Canada 0.239 (0.004) 0.203 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.073 (0.010) 0.011 (0.001)
Czech Republic 0.205 (0.006) 0.218 (0.014) 0.003 (0.000) 0.063 (0.011) 0.004 (0.004)
Denmark 0.276 (0.004) 0.251 (0.014) 0.003 (0.000) 0.061 (0.020) 0.005 (0.001)
Estonia 0.226 (0.006) 0.259 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.107 (0.048) -0.002 (0.001)
Finland 0.252 (0.002) 0.261 (0.014) 0.002 (0.000) 0.076 (0.008) 0.005 (0.000)
France 0.284 (0.003) 0.261 (0.007) 0.002 (0.000) 0.085 (0.009) 0.005 (0.000)
Germany 0.205 (0.002) 0.310 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.071 (0.012) -0.004 (0.003)
Hungary 0.215 (0.003) 0.241 (0.006) 0.002 (0.000) 0.098 (0.017) -0.003 (0.001)
Iceland 0.311 (0.003) 0.179 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.056 (0.024) 0.008 (0.013)
Israel 0.454 (0.005) 0.160 (0.004) 0.002 (0.000) 0.083 (0.011) 0.019 (0.002)
Korea 0.227 (0.016) 0.149 (0.009) 0.002 (0.000) 0.035 (0.002) 0.006 (0.001)
Luxembourg 0.259 (0.008) 0.204 (0.002) 0.002 (0.000) 0.048 (0.005) 0.019 (0.003)
Netherlands 0.263 (0.003) 0.230 (0.012) 0.002 (0.000) 0.041 (0.008) 0.004 (0.001)
New Zealand 0.316 (0.001) 0.195 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.058 (0.014) 0.009 (0.002)
Norway 0.285 (0.004) 0.226 (0.006) 0.002 (0.000) 0.031 (0.004) 0.012 (0.001)
Poland 0.215 (0.003) 0.191 (0.003) 0.002 (0.000) 0.092 (0.012) 0.002 (0.004)
Portugal 0.230 (0.004) 0.277 (0.010) 0.002 (0.000) 0.113 (0.032) -0.000 (0.002)
Slovak Republic 0.217 (0.004) 0.173 (0.005) 0.002 (0.000) 0.125 (0.019) 0.001 (0.000)
Slovenia 0.203 (0.004) 0.238 (0.006) 0.001 (0.000) 0.067 (0.018) 0.004 (0.003)
Spain 0.218 (0.005) 0.247 (0.008) 0.002 (0.000) 0.173 (0.063) 0.009 (0.007)
Sweden 0.257 (0.003) 0.279 (0.012) 0.002 (0.000) 0.076 (0.011) 0.008 (0.001)
Switzerland 0.220 (0.007) 0.252 (0.011) 0.002 (0.000) 0.042 (0.006) 0.009 (0.005)
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150Numbers in parentheses stand for the standard deviation.
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Table 4: Descriptive stastistics of OECD panel data: by year
year recipients ratio logit recipients ratio mgincome mgincome 2 gdp capita log gdp capita youth dependency old dependency divorce rate unemployment population growth
Mean
2007 0.016 -4.339 0.396 0.164 35645.300 10.419 0.257 0.221 0.002 0.060 0.007
2008 0.015 -4.383 0.391 0.160 37381.672 10.468 0.255 0.223 0.002 0.057 0.008
2009 0.016 -4.311 0.397 0.164 36290.570 10.443 0.253 0.226 0.002 0.078 0.007
2010 0.017 -4.275 0.400 0.166 37469.973 10.476 0.252 0.230 0.002 0.084 0.006
2011 0.016 -4.370 0.399 0.166 39355.518 10.524 0.252 0.234 0.002 0.081 0.005
2012 0.016 -4.284 0.398 0.166 40086.599 10.543 0.252 0.240 0.002 0.083 0.005
Median
2007 0.016 -4.147 0.400 0.160 36871.534 10.515 0.249 0.229 0.002 0.054 0.005
2008 0.014 -4.231 0.400 0.160 38133.413 10.549 0.242 0.234 0.002 0.056 0.007
2009 0.015 -4.212 0.400 0.160 37695.802 10.537 0.240 0.237 0.002 0.078 0.005
2010 0.015 -4.156 0.400 0.160 38737.069 10.565 0.237 0.239 0.002 0.077 0.005
2011 0.015 -4.194 0.420 0.176 40683.337 10.614 0.236 0.240 0.002 0.072 0.004
2012 0.016 -4.127 0.420 0.176 40619.937 10.612 0.236 0.248 0.002 0.074 0.004
Standard Deviation
2007 0.009 0.775 0.082 0.064 13813.492 0.353 0.054 0.039 0.000 0.024 0.007
2008 0.008 0.758 0.084 0.064 14436.887 0.348 0.054 0.040 0.000 0.022 0.007
2009 0.009 0.731 0.082 0.065 13382.286 0.336 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.033 0.007
2010 0.009 0.728 0.080 0.065 13804.461 0.330 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.040 0.006
2011 0.010 0.865 0.084 0.068 14869.727 0.330 0.053 0.041 0.000 0.040 0.007
2012 0.009 0.726 0.089 0.071 15019.149 0.329 0.054 0.042 0.000 0.046 0.007
Notes: T = 6, n = 25, N = 150.
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Table 5: Results of empirical analysis using OECD panel data
Dependent variable:
logit recipients ratio
Pooling one-way FE two-way FE one-way RE two-way RE
mgincome 15.434∗∗ 18.021∗∗∗ 19.430∗∗∗ 17.534∗∗∗ 19.006∗∗∗
(6.382) (6.737) (7.076) (6.704) (6.843)
mgincome 2 −16.573∗∗ −21.915∗∗∗ −23.710∗∗∗ −21.050∗∗ −22.761∗∗∗
(7.593) (7.800) (8.399) (8.198) (8.512)
log gdp capita 0.252 0.492 0.332 0.423 0.352
(0.264) (0.394) (0.570) (0.261) (0.295)
unemployment 2.736 5.417∗∗∗ 5.842∗∗∗ 5.250∗∗∗ 5.602∗∗∗
(2.387) (1.654) (2.019) (1.375) (1.775)
youth dependency −6.370∗∗∗ −4.024 −5.626 −5.208 −6.160
(1.624) (7.033) (7.782) (3.685) (4.189)
old dependency −8.012∗∗∗ −4.283 −8.213 −5.069 −7.638
(2.192) (5.286) (8.324) (3.977) (5.348)
divorce rate 81.888 244.345 281.102 204.770 255.144
(172.752) (210.052) (216.581) (186.280) (191.322)
population growth −4.079 12.090∗ 12.621∗ 10.512 11.681
(13.483) (7.213) (7.048) (8.717) (8.643)
Constant −7.279∗∗ −10.693∗∗∗ −9.555∗∗∗
(2.932) (3.323) (3.354)
R2 0.163 0.233 0.246 0.214 0.251
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.023 −0.003 0.170 0.179
F -test (vs. pooling) 57.200 ∗∗∗ 47.991∗∗∗
F -test (vs. one-way FE) 1.219
LM -test (vs. pooling) 17.294∗∗∗ 11.119∗∗∗
Hausman-test (vs. random effect) 1.424 0.950
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for standard error calculated by HAC (Arellano,
1987) estimator. Above ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
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Table 6: ‘group 1’ countries less than an estimated maximum of recipients ratio logit
by one-way RE
group 1
country year name year country year name year
Austria 2008 AT08 Luxembourg 2007 LU07
Austria 2009 AT09 New Zealand 2008 NZ08
Austria 2010 AT10 Norway 2007 NO07
Canada 2007 CA07 Norway 2008 NO08
Canada 2008 CA08 Norway 2009 NO09
Canada 2009 CA09 Norway 2010 NO10
Canada 2010 CA10 Norway 2011 NO11
Canada 2011 CA11 Norway 2012 NO12
Canada 2012 CA12 Poland 2007 PL07
Czech Republic 2007 CZ07 Poland 2008 PL08
Czech Republic 2008 CZ08 Poland 2009 PL09
Czech Republic 2009 CZ09 Poland 2010 PL10
Czech Republic 2010 CZ10 Poland 2011 PL11
Czech Republic 2011 CZ11 Poland 2012 PL12
Czech Republic 2012 CZ12 Portugal 2007 PT07
Estonia 2007 EE07 Portugal 2008 PT08
Estonia 2008 EE08 Portugal 2009 PT09
Estonia 2009 EE09 Portugal 2010 PT10
Estonia 2010 EE10 Portugal 2011 PT11
Estonia 2011 EE11 Portugal 2012 PT12
Estonia 2012 EE12 Slovak Republic 2007 SK07
France 2007 FR07 Slovak Republic 2008 SK08
France 2008 FR08 Slovak Republic 2009 SK09
France 2009 FR09 Slovak Republic 2010 SK10
France 2010 FR10 Slovak Republic 2011 SK11
France 2011 FR11 Slovak Republic 2012 SK12
France 2012 FR12 Slovenia 2007 SI07
Hungary 2009 HU09 Slovenia 2008 SI08
Hungary 2010 HU10 Spain 2007 ES07
Hungary 2011 HU11 Spain 2008 ES08
Hungary 2012 HU12 Spain 2009 ES09
Iceland 2007 IS07 Spain 2010 ES10
Iceland 2008 IS08 Spain 2011 ES11
Iceland 2009 IS09 Spain 2012 ES12
Korea 2007 KR07 Sweden 2007 SE07
Korea 2008 KR08 Sweden 2008 SE08
Korea 2009 KR09 Sweden 2009 SE09
Korea 2010 KR10 Sweden 2010 SE10
Korea 2011 KR11 Sweden 2011 SE11
Korea 2012 KR12 Sweden 2012 SE12
Notes: ‘group 1’ defined by countries with the value of recipients ratio logit which is
less than an estimated maximum of recipients ratio logit by one-way RE. Column
‘name year’ indicates ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the
year.
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Table 7: ‘group 2’ countries less than an estimated maximum of recipients ratio logit
by one-way RE
group 2
country year name year country year name year
Australia 2007 AU07 Israel 2009 IL09
Australia 2008 AU08 Israel 2010 IL10
Australia 2009 AU09 Israel 2011 IL11
Australia 2010 AU10 Israel 2012 IL12
Australia 2011 AU11 Luxembourg 2008 LU08
Australia 2012 AU12 Luxembourg 2009 LU09
Austria 2007 AT07 Luxembourg 2010 LU10
Austria 2011 AT11 Luxembourg 2011 LU11
Austria 2012 AT12 Luxembourg 2012 LU12
Belgium 2007 BE07 Netherlands 2007 NL07
Belgium 2008 BE08 Netherlands 2008 NL08
Belgium 2009 BE09 Netherlands 2009 NL09
Belgium 2010 BE10 Netherlands 2010 NL10
Belgium 2011 BE11 Netherlands 2011 NL11
Belgium 2012 BE12 Netherlands 2012 NL12
Denmark 2007 DK07 New Zealand 2007 NZ07
Denmark 2008 DK08 New Zealand 2009 NZ09
Denmark 2009 DK09 New Zealand 2010 NZ10
Denmark 2010 DK10 New Zealand 2011 NZ11
Denmark 2011 DK11 New Zealand 2012 NZ12
Denmark 2012 DK12 Slovenia 2009 SI09
Finland 2007 FI07 Slovenia 2010 SI10
Finland 2008 FI08 Slovenia 2011 SI11
Finland 2009 FI09 Slovenia 2012 SI12
Finland 2010 FI10 Switzerland 2007 CH07
Finland 2011 FI11 Switzerland 2008 CH08
Finland 2012 FI12 Switzerland 2009 CH09
Germany 2007 DE07 Switzerland 2010 CH10
Germany 2008 DE08 Switzerland 2011 CH11
Germany 2009 DE09 Switzerland 2012 CH12
Germany 2010 DE10
Germany 2011 DE11
Germany 2012 DE12
Hungary 2007 HU07
Hungary 2008 HU08
Iceland 2010 IS10
Iceland 2011 IS11
Iceland 2012 IS12
Israel 2007 IL07
Israel 2008 IL08
Notes: ‘group 2’ defined by countries with the value of recipients ratio logit which is
more than an estimated maximum of recipients ratio logit by one-way RE. Column
‘name year’ indicate ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of countries with the last two digits of the
year.
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Table 8: Results of empirical analysis using OECD panel data: Sensitivity analysis
Dependent variable:
logit recipients ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
mgincome 18.939∗∗ 19.186∗∗ 16.213∗∗ 18.320∗∗ 16.694∗∗ 17.301∗∗
(9.435) (9.375) (7.005) (7.447) (7.068) (7.034)
mgincome 2 −23.707∗∗ −24.034∗∗ −20.404∗∗ −22.777∗∗ −20.186∗∗ −20.831∗∗
(11.871) (11.807) (8.935) (9.430) (9.048) (8.722)
log gdp capita 0.084 0.067 0.033 0.367∗ 0.518∗
(0.272) (0.275) (0.300) (0.214) (0.278)
unemployment 2.942∗∗∗ 2.879∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗ 4.730∗∗∗
(0.733) (0.768) (0.740) (1.086)
youth dependency −3.903 −5.660 −5.629
(3.077) (3.985) (3.953)
old dependency −6.206 −6.518
(4.810) (4.823)
divorce rate 206.935
(187.571)
population growth
Constant −7.950∗∗∗ −8.873∗∗ −8.333∗∗ −7.431∗ −8.931∗∗∗ −11.083∗∗∗
(1.877) (3.586) (3.439) (3.869) (3.016) (3.277)
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150
R2 0.081 0.082 0.138 0.153 0.184 0.196
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.064 0.114 0.124 0.150 0.156
Notes: Numbers in parentheses stand for standard error calculated by HAC (Arellano,
1987) estimator. Above ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1%,
respectively.
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